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Abstract. The debt-peonage system is an agreement between patrons and laborers in different 
economic activities worldwide. A common feature is social exploitation of laborers that generate 
profits to the patrons. In recent literature it has been argued that debt-peonage can be an 
economically sound arrangement that secures the needs of actors. The paper evaluates to what 
extent traditionally strong debt-peonage in forest-dwelling communities in the Bolivian Amazon, 
has developed in a way that better secures the needs and economic interest of multiple actors. 
Case studies in sixteen communities yielded qualitative information on debt relations between 
peasants, traders and former patrons. Debt-peonage changed from a mechanism to provide and 
keep workforce indebted to new social relationships, equitable commercial links, opportunity to 
access work capital and production chain diversification. This rapid shift was caused by 
important changes in land and forest regulations. 
 





Debt-peonage is a form of labor agreement still in use worldwide today. The practice is rooted in 
the social, cultural and economic heritage in some countries (Barham and Coomes 1994a, 
Stackley 1999). Debt-peonage is seen by many scholars as a perverse form of social subjugation 
and exploitation. The practice was reported in the Amazon basin during the rubber boom (Assies 
2002, Burberi 2007, Fifer 1970, da Cunha 1957), in Central America on post-colonial haciendas 
(Brown 2003, Meyers and Carlson 2002, Parrish 1982), in New Mexico in the arrangements 
between the Spanish-speaking population and the English-dominant society (Knowlton 1962) 
and in India on the estates that remained from the colonial period (Bhandari 2009). 
 
The authors cited above mostly considered debt-peonage as a form of inhuman treatment, but 
others interpreted it as: social relations of pre-capitalist production (Weinstein 1986), livelihood 
strategies based on power imbalances between oppressor and oppressed (Brown 2006, Knight 
1986), a relatively effective mechanism to leverage resources difficult to access, or an efficient 
type of contract given certain work conditions (Barham and Coomes 1994b). A common element 
among these different interpretations is its importance to provide for and control workers, 
according to the requirements of productive activities where labor was needed (Bales 2000, 
MacDonald and McWhiney 1980, Washbrook 2006). 
 
In all cases where debt-peonage persists it has elements of individual and collective decision-
making but entails subjugation imposed by a powerful group in response to a workforce’s needs 
and the opportunities of alternative work available. The acceptance of debt peonage is based on 
the comparative advantages that this means in terms of the worker's welfare (Bauer 1979, Knight 
1988, Martinez-Alier 1977), influenced by the type of relation between laborer and patron. For 
instance, in Central America, peasant resistance to wage labor was the answer to their preference 
for a feudal system (Knight 1986). In the Amazon basin during the rubber boom, people 
accepted debt-peonage to retain the advantages of individual work autonomy characteristic of an 
extractive model (Barham and Coomes 1994b, Weinstein 1986). In the northern Amazon region 
of Bolivia during the barraca or Brazil nut estate period, debt peonage was seen as a necessary 
condition to initiate productive work in the field (Bojanic 2001), but also as a way to access 
credit and reduce transaction costs of extracting and transporting the harvested product (Barzel 
1989, Barham and Coomes 1994b, 1994c, Stoian 2006). 
 
In the northern Bolivian Amazon, debt-peonage, locally called   habilito’ evolved particularly 
among social actors linked to the productive sectors of rubber, Brazil nut and timber, modifying 
the levels of dependency between them. Before the second agrarian reform in Bolivia during 
1990s, habilito allowed patrons to attract workers and ensure their permanence on the barracas 
under conditions controlled by the employer. The second agrarian reform, however, transferred 
property rights of land and natural resources, including over areas of former Brazil nut estates, 
from patrons to communities. Since then forest dwellers have greater decision capacity over the 
use of valuable forest resources, which also allows them to negotiate more favourable terms for 
the sale of these resources and more favourable loan conditions. As a consequence, habilito in 
the region has become a mechanism to negotiate access to resources where the new form of 
ownership requires new forms of negotiation. 
 
The current use of habilito in northern Bolivia raises some fundamental questions of debt-
peonage as a labor negotiation and contracting tool. The classical definition of debt-peonage is 
the payment of a loan with the labor or services of the debtor (Bauer 1979, Knight 1986, 1988, 
Washbrook 2006). The typical case of debt-peonage is that both capital and assets requiring 
labor are monopolized by one party, allowing that party to establish the conditions of 
compensation for work services provided. However, what happens in the case entrepreneurs 
intend to use the mechanism of debt-peonage when they do not control the same assets (Rutledge 
1975)? What happens when one of the engaging parties controls capital, and the other the labor 
and the productive assets that require labor? How do early forms of debt-peonage change among 
former employers and employees when a new regime of property rights replaces an old 
arrangement where debt-peonage was common? To what extent do these actors who previously 
accepted debts learn to use their new rights in negotiations in debt-peonage arrangements? The 
answers to these questions are the innovations that characterize the evolution of habilito in the 
northern Bolivian Amazon, following the regulatory changes that started since the mid-1990s. 
 
This paper consists of seven sections including this introduction. Section 2 describes the methods 
used to collect and analysis data and the research area. Section 3 analyses debt-peonage during 
the time of rubber exploitation, and the role it acquired during changes of social relations and the 
emergence of independent peasant communities. It also reviews the contemporary function of 
habilito in the livelihoods of the rural population and the influence of habilito on trade 
relationships, power and cash flows into communities that engage in Brazil nut production. It 
furthermore analyses the benefits of habilito in the Brazil nut production chain. Section 5 
discusses the findings emphasizing the most important aspects of the new culture of habilito 
from a local and international perspective and section 6 concludes. 
 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
 
We conducted research in sixteen rural communities located in the departments of Pando and 
Beni in the northern Bolivian Amazon. Communities that engage in habilito in the northern 
Bolivian Amazon are mostly characterized as mestizo settlements (Fuentes et al. 2005). These 
communities are the result of resettling of the mixed population that migrated into the region 
ever since the rubber boom started, late 19
th
 century. Initially the rural population of northern 
Bolivia that was part of the early rubber and Brazil nut sectors mostly lived inside barracas until 
the mid-1950s. Since then many barraca residents moved to independent communities, which 
developed as fairly autonomous villages that engage in agriculture and other tropical forest 
natural resource use, with different degrees of participation in the regional market economy.  
Other communities in the region only separated from barracas in more recent times, or they 
were abandoned by previous barraca owners since the mid-1990s land reforms. Over the last 
half century or so, but especially since the 1990s, the region has experienced much intra-regional 
migration (Stoian and Henkemans 2000, Stoian 2006). The region has a few sparse ethnic 
indigenous groups that these days own extensive areas of legally recognized indigenous territory, 
but they have much less engagement with the Brazil nut sector and were not included in our 
sample.  
 
The sample of communities for research was randomly selected from among mestizo 
communities, using the basic criterion of dependency on non-timber forest resources, 
distinguishing between agro extractive and extractive communities (Stoian and Henkemans 
2000). Based on our first initial survey, the sixteen communities were divided in those with high 
Brazil nut production and related labor demands and communities with lower Brazil nut 
production (Cano 2012) and we selected randomly eight communities of each category. We 
conducted semi-structured interviews with key informants who were long term permanent 
residents in their community, knowledgeable of community issues, but also involved in Brazil 
nut extraction. We also interviewed traders and barraca owners before, during and after the 
harvest season. We observed actual bargaining of habilito and sale of Brazil nuts between sellers 
and buyers. The above information was supplemented by informal interviews with 
representatives of NGOs operating in the region, obtaining a total of 171 in-depth interviews. 
 
The interviews provided qualitative information on changes of social relations, and the 
dependency and changes of habilito since its early use until today. Analysis of the information 
focused on risk management in the negotiations of habilito, power relations in those negotiations 
and the use of ideological discourse to impose forms of repayment. It also focused on control of 
labor and the emergence of new labor arrangements. We collected data on income and 
expenditures channeled through habilito, and of number of transactions. We only focused on 
habilito transactions linked to communities in the region that engaged in Brazil nut collecting 
and trade. 
 
The northern Bolivian Amazon 
 
The northern Bolivian Amazon, which contains Pando and the Amazon region of Beni covers 
86,261 km
2
 and has a population of 211,572 inhabitants in 2007 (INE 2007). The region is 
mostly covered with tropical rain forest with a natural abundance of Brazil nut (Bertholletia 
excelsa) and rubber (Hevea brasiliensis) (DHV 1993). The most important commercial economic 
activities today are the collection of Brazil nuts and timber extraction and trade in the regional 
towns and border regions. Social relations in the region were until recently based on the customs 
that governed life in the former barraca. These were forest extraction production units 
comprising of a forest estate and a workforce hat was tied to the estate through debt-peonage 
(Ruiz 2005, Stoian 2006). 
 
Brazil nut extraction was until recently the main source of cash among the region’s rural 
inhabitants, more recently complemented with income from timber sales. Agriculture, hunting 
and fishing are mostly for household consumption although they contribute to cash income in 
communities near major urban centres (Zenteno 2012). Mestizo communities in the region divide 
into agro-extractive communities, i.e. those that depend to a larger degree on agriculture and 
extractive communities, i.e. those that depend more on Brazil nut extraction and timber) (Stoian 
and Henkemans 2000, Zenteno et al. 2013, de Jong et al. 2013). 
Since the late 1980s, Brazil nut extraction became the only non-timber forest product industry in 
the region, and this was soon followed by far reaching decentralization of the national 
government, forest legislation reform and a second agrarian reform (de Jong et al. 2006). As a 
result, rural settlements many of which were located inside old barracas acquired for the first 
time legal status and acquired formal title over their lands (Pacheco 2006). The new forestry law 
of 1996 changed access rights to forests, bestowing peasants and indigenous people the exclusive 
right of forest exploitation over land that had legally become theirs (Forest Law No. 1700). 
However, habilito practices and some forms of social relations characteristics of the barraca in 
previous times largely continued as before (del Pilar-Gamarra 2007). The reform process 
described above triggered a reallocation of rights to access and use of forest resources and land, 
forging new ties of dependency and mutual cooperation among actors that are described in the 
following sections. 
 
THE EVOLUTION OF HABILITO IN NORTHERN BOLIVIA 
 
Transition of habilito from the barraca to the community 
 
Habilito emerged during the boom of rubber extraction in the Amazon basin. In Bolivia it 
originated as a merger between coercive servitude in the west of the country and the customs of 
advanced payments during the period of quinine extraction in the northern Bolivia Amazon 
before the rubber boom (del Pilar-Gamarra 2007, Stoian 2006). Barraca workers maintained 
long daily work routines and had to buy at credit daily necessities at the company stores. 
Barraca owners set the prices for goods and forbid workers to practice agriculture on the estate 
(Stoian 2000).  
 
After the definite decline of rubber production in northern Bolivia by late 1980s, many of the 
previous barraca residents migrated to the region’s major towns, Cobija, Guayaramerin and 
Riberalta. Since the early 1990s international demand for Brazil nuts increased resulting in a 
resurgence of the barraca and the return of habilito (Stoian 2000). The organization of labor also 
changed as fewer workers reside inside the barracas and collectors migrate to the Brazil areas 
every year from late November and until early March. The means of production remained under 
the control of the patrons but there was a decrease of control that they held over forest workers 
who now lived in the major towns and independent communities (Henkemans 2001). Habilito 
was revitalized as it allowed patrons to control workers operating in the field. In this new period 
of the barraca – habilito organization of Brazil nut production, previous coercive means were 
replaced by an ideological discourse that helped to consolidate the bonds of dependency between 
forest workers and patrons (Barham and Coomes 1994a). This discourse was often reinforced by 
pseudo family ties, as patrons became godfathers of their workers’ children (Lyons 2006). The 
socio-economic ties between patrons and forest workers transformed into a relationship of 
reciprocity, as it provided a sense of security to workers and ensured a steady supply of raw 
materials to the Brazil nut entrepreneurs. During this period, joining a Brazil nut extraction 
workforce and working under habilito arrangements was an individual decision enticed by the 
security offered to rural and peri-urban dwellers and their families. The concurrence of people 
who worked under a habilito arrangement and people who choose a different option confirms 
this (Henkemans 2000, Stoian 2006). 
 
During the 1990s the Brazil nut production chain started with a private company who managed 
capital and the market. The second link was mostly of traders, and the last link constituted 
independent communities and Brazil nut collectors (Figure 1). This reflects a reduction of actors 
because the barraca was no longer a basic operative unit of forest product exploitation as in 
previous years (Pacheco 1992), but rather had become an area over which Brazil nut 
entrepreneurs held exclusive harvesting rights. This situation once again changed after the legal 
tenure reform that began in Bolivia during the mid-1990s and were implemented in the north into 
the 2000s. As a result, relations of subordination evolved to capitalist trade relations because the 
old Brazil nut collectors, who only could negotiate based on their control of their own labor, now 
could negotiate based on their control over forest areas with Brazil nut trees. Since then new 
opportunities of mutual benefit arose based on the negotiation of rights to access resource in 




Habilito in the livelihoods of forest dwellers 
 
Habilito nowadays plays an important role in the livelihoods of remote forest dwellers in 
northern Bolivia (Assies 1997) as it allows them to obtain consumables that are not otherwise 
available. However, there are several particularities of the Brazil nut extraction process that also 
explains the continuing use of habilito (McDonald and McWhiney 1980). At the beginning of 
the Brazil nut harvest in November a family’s food reserves are limited. This period coincides 
with the completion of the planting season in northern Bolivia (DHV 1993) and products of the 
annual harvest are not available yet. Thus, the negotiations for advance payments start as 
requests for food and other daily necessities. The demands vary substantially depending on 
family needs. Families who manage their agricultural plots for continuous supply may reduce 
significantly the amount of goods they request as advance payment compared to more 
opportunistic food producers. The difference may range between US$ 14 and US$ 100 that a 
family receives at the beginning of the Brazil nut harvest (Zenteno 2012). 
 
According to Zenteno (2012), 45 percent of a sample of 239 households had negotiated habilito 
during 2008, when the Brazil nut prices were one third of the value reported from the previous 
year (Table 1). The group that negotiated habilito obtained more than 31 percent of their rice 
consumption not from their own fields, had 21 per cent less agricultural crops, and owned 56 
percent fewer pigs than families who did not rely on habilito (Table 1). On the other hand, in 
spite of the decrease of the Brazil nut price, the population with habilito collected 43 percent 
more Brazil nut boxes, had a 38 percent higher income from Brazil nut sales and 22 percent 
higher earnings from the sales of timber, than those without habilito (Table 1). Dependence on 
habilito continues as long as the receivers of habilito continue delivering the raw material that 
motivates the merchant to assume the risk of investing in habilito. The major volume of product 




Habilito in the commercial relations of forest dweller communities 
 
Nowadays, Brazil nut collection is carried out by people living in remote communities and by 
people residing in the peri-urban neighborhoods of Cobija, Riberalta and Guyaramerin, the 
region’s major towns. Our data indicate that peri-urban residents can earn between $US 1000 
and $US 2000, during a year with good Brazil nut prices when employed as Brazil nut collectors 
in communities or in the few areas that are still exploited as barraca. A rural family that controls 
500 hectares of land (which is the effective area allocated to single families during Bolivia’s 
latest land reform) can at a price of $US 17 per box (price registered in 2009), obtain over $US 
2550 for 150 boxes of Brazil nut. Information obtained in 2008 on income from Brazil nut sales 
in communities with variable distance from urban centres (from 10 km to more than 100 km 
measured in hours of travel to the community), revealed the notable margin of benefits 
channeled through habilito, in spite of the low prices registered that year (Figure 2). According 
to this information, the price of Brazil nut tends to decrease when access to the community 
becomes more difficult, because of large distance or poor road connections. On the other hand, 
communities with this limitation can often compensate this by collecting larger volumes as they 
may have access to a larger number of Brazil nut trees (Zenteno et al. 2013). 
Our findings suggest that nowadays community residents and peri-urban residents in northern 
Bolivia obtain economic surplus because of an interaction of three factors: (1) the increase of the 
Brazil nut price; (2) the change of habilito as an instrument to impose or accept debt and 
commitments to assure benefits, into an economic alternative option that is available even for 
people who do not reside in the forest, and (3) the reassignment of property rights over land and 
access to forest resources. 
 
We observed that the negotiation of habilito between community members and traders has 
changed. Currently traders cannot access the Brazil nut stocks belonging to communities if they 
fail to establish good relationships with community members. These relationships are largely 
channeled, using habilito as an incentive. If a trader has sufficient capacity to ensure habilito 
during the harvest season, the more likely he is to develop strong social and commercial ties with 
communities that control Brazil nut stocks. A trader has to be willing to provide habilito during 
periods of low Brazil nut prices, when expected benefits may be negative, and even out of the 
harvest season. Under such an agreement, the trader makes a risky investment in exchange for a 
monopoly access to Brazil nuts in a particular area. 
 
We also observed cases in which traders established a working agreement with members of 
families who dominated communal economy and politics in eight communities of the total 
sample. The trader provided substantial amounts of cash or in kind as an advance payment to 
these dominant family members. The recipients reinvested these funds or goods among other 
community members, according to their own social rules. The dominant group captured benefits 
when transferring habilito interest to other community members. This transfer takes place more 
and less the same as in the early barraca system, selling overpriced consumables and paying less 
for the product.  We call this mode "second-tier habilito", as the first-tier habilito is between the 
trader and dominant community members.  
 
The benefits obtained by the dominant group have a cost. The dominant family members assume 
a commitment to control communal Brazil nut extraction and enforce the habilito in the 
community. The dominant family members are perceived by the rest of the community as the 
new patrons as they control both capital, but also strongly the rules of access to land and Brazil 
nut forests. The benefits, however, are significant. They pay between  $US 0,71 to US$ 1,43 less 
for a single box that the traders to whom they resell the boxes. On average, dominant families 
annually gained $US 10,700 for operating as habilito intermediaries. In addition to paying less 
for a box of Brazil nut, dominant family members may charge for the right to harvest Brazil nuts 
or demand a percentage of the harvest for themselves. In one community, dominant family 
members charged $US 0.57 for a box of Brazil nut harvested, but which they did not buy 
themselves from community members. In another community they charged as a fee 10% of the 
total amount harvested. Opposition to these measures is usually punished by social exclusion 
from the community. Table 2 shows a classification of interviewees based on their capacity to 
collect Brazil nuts. The ‘large producers’ correspond to the dominant families within a 
community who obtain income from their own land and reselling Brazil nuts from other 
community which they obtained through the second-tier habilito. We observed dominant 
families controlling Brazil nut trade in communities in 25% of the studied communities. 
Dominant groups have more and expensive goods than the rest of the community members, 
enough money to have their kids studying in the regional towns or even own a house there 




Dominant families who engage in second tier habilito default on deliveries or sell their harvest to 
a different trader than the one who provided the advance payment. They use these funds to have 
more capital to trade inside the own or neighboring communities. Debts that dominant families 
accumulate with traders are commonly compensated by exclusive access of the same traders to 
Brazil nut stocks within the community. The trader then acquired a virtual harvesting monopoly 
in exchange for flexibility or forgiveness of existing debts. Interviewees revealed that some 
traders may have unpaid debts of up to $US 20.000 under such schemes. 
 
Habilito in the Brazil nut production chain  
 
The breakdown of the former barraca structure led to the reconfiguration of local powers and 
social relations, triggering the emergence of specializations in the Brazil nut production chain, 
and specific rules to regulate performance of each link. In addition to the reasons given above, 
this also explains why northern Bolivian forest dwellers continued to depend on habilito still 
controlled by the old patrons. It also partly explains why old patrons stopped their efforts to 
regain the power that gave them de facto tenure over land and valuable forest products. The 
adaptation of habilito to the new reality of the Brazil nut sector contributed to this diversification 
and specialization, and recognition of the importance of each actor. For example, peasants have 
always had the ability to undertake extractive activities. Under the new reality, however, traders 
and intermediaries, many of who were former patrons, developed the ability to trade. The change 
in property rights over land and forests forced these actors to master those skills, including 
seeking mutual cooperation, to negotiate Brazil nut supply.  
 
The security of being able to rely on habilito ensures a proper organization of the early stages of 
Brazil nut harvesting.  This is especially the case in remote communities. One month before the 
start of the Brazil nut harvest, forest dwellers must clear trails, repair roads and fix temporary 
storage facilities, activities that require at least one month on average (Interviews, 2009). If 
peasants would have to assure funds for the harvest without resorting to habilito, the 
opportunities for exploiting Brazil nuts would decrease substantially. Forest dwellers are not 
eligible for bank loans, and even if they were, it would take a prohibitively amounts of time and 
resources to negotiate such loans. In addition to pre-harvest investment, habilito greatly 
facilitates continued Brazil nut collection. The Brazil nut harvest demands for extended stays in 
the forest. When daily necessities are exhausted, Brazil nut collectors only make a short trip to 
restock from the trader, without worry of having to find another source of supply. 
 
Once Brazil nut collection has finished the collector faces the challenge of moving his product to 
any Brazil nut company located in the regional towns. In riverside communities the movement of 
150 boxes of Brazil nut of 25 kg might cost about $US 700. With the price of $US 17 per box in 
2009, this leaves a positive balance of $US 1,850. The cost of taking the product out of the forest 
to the factory is approximately 27 percent of its total value. Because the collector delivers the 




Our investigation demonstrates how an anachronistic mechanism of debt-peonage can - under 
certain circumstances - develop into an economic instrument that plays an essential role in an 
economic sector that has adapted to new political, social and economic realities. Worldwide, 
evidence exists on how debt peonage has evolved from a mechanism of social submission to a 
mechanism that is used in transactions under an economic rationality where partners need to 
determine priorities and needs, in order to capture benefits that they are seeking (Barham and 
Coomes 1994a, 1994b, 1994c, Gild 2006, Knight 1986, Washbrook 2006, Weinstein 1986). In 
all the cases studied these changes resulted from strategies of adjustment to changes in economic 
factors that connected the various actors through labor and other productive relations. 
Nevertheless, in all the same cases to some degree and during variable periods, some elements of 
the mechanism’s original exploitative nature persisted. This can be attributed to economic elite, 
mostly former patrons, who continue to use habilito to further its own interests. The more 
resource-endowed and powerful actors continue to seek hegemony of the productive chain in 
which they participate. 
 
According to our research, in the northern Bolivian Amazon property rights over land and the 
exclusive right to decide over the use of valuable forest resources triggered transcendental 
changes in the balance of power among actors linked to the former modality of debt-peonage 
(Cano 2012). In spite of the social tensions at the onset of these changes, a certain degree of 
awareness was reached among actors with regard to their comparative advantages, stimulating a 
conduct of cooperation to preserve the new niches of power and assure access to valuable 
resources. A clear evidence of this is the reconfiguration of rights among on the one hand former 
patrons, traders and businessmen who control the means of production and on the other, rural 
communities who control the resources. The former labor relationships that marked the pre 
reform forest product sectors in northern Bolivia have become a commercial, c.q. capitalist 
relationship adapted to the limits of access and use of forest products. 
 
The new conditions under which habilito is applied in northern Bolivia have modified the social, 
economic and labor relations. Until the recent changes in northern Bolivia habilito was mainly 
used to assure the supply of labor necessary for harvesting rubber and Brazil nuts (Bojanic 2001). 
Nowadays, the main item that is negotiated is the valuable forest resource that some control and 
want to sell, and others want to buy. Representatives of the various social sectors linked to the 
production chain, Brazil nut companies, the union of the Brazil nut collectors and representatives 
of the government, participate in negotiations of the Brazil nut price, which is done very early in 
the Brazil nut harvesting seasons to guarantee the transparency in prices and avoid tensions 
(Bojanic 2001). Traders in the field use this as guidance but adjust the price they pay, depending 
on their cost benefit assessment, however, without diverting too much from the official price. 
 
Defaulting on the commercial obligations by one of the actors in a habilito agreement, which 
does happen frequently, can be understood from different perspectives: as immoral behaviour, as 
a legal infraction, or as a manifestation of the rights and power of each of the parties involved in 
the negotiation process. However, negotiations take place in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance, 
and not anymore as an imposition of the powerful patron towards the forest workers. But what 
explains this change in attitude among both groups of actors, for some towards a tolerance 
previously unacceptable while for others overstepping the limits of socially acceptable 
behaviour? Beside the spontaneous agreements that arose around the common interest in a 
particular resource, it seems that the opening of spaces of social individual and collective 
participation, as well as the exercise of the civil rights in the political arena as stipulated in the 
Popular Participation Law Nº 1551 the  Municipalities Law Nº 2028, contributed to these 
changes.  As a result of those changes, social conduct of the individual is not constrained 
anymore by former rules of submission and subordination, and this resulted in a new perception 
of social class, which is also reflected the negotiations of habilito. 
 
In most of the cases studied, despite the changes in the balance of power, the perception of 
superiority of the patron continues in their relations with the labor class. The division between 
property rights over the resources and the means of production seems to reduce class differences 
when both have an interest to negotiate economic benefits from the use of forest resources. The 
result of this process is an increased respect between classes because of the links that they hold 
to their material means of production. 
 
Key aspect in this discussion is the valuable forest resources themselves. Habilito is intrinsically 
tied to a great dependency on a particular resource, which partly allowed for the arbitrary control 
of the patrons over their laborers. Our research suggests that the mechanism can evolve towards 
more profitable scenarios for both actors, which is directly related to the productive 
diversification of actors in the production chain. However, it can be argued that the process of 
adaptation of habilito to a transformed Brazil nut production chain is conditioned by only one 
valuable forest product. Therefore, what can be expected in the future if this link changes 
radically due to a dramatic decrease of Brazil nut? The dependence on one valuable resource 
which is the mainstay of the local economy represents an important risk to the society of the 
region. The development of new productive activities could entail a new accommodation of the 
social, economic and power balance linked to the current productive activities based on the use 
of valuable forest resources. However, taken into account the evolution of habilito and the 
influence of legal reforms and economic changes in that process, a new relationship might 
develop, based on new forms of debt-peonage.   
 
In our view, the study of the evolution of habilito in the northern Bolivian Amazon demonstrated 
the multiple alternatives of a mechanism that previously had the main objective to control and 
exploit a human group, towards a social mechanism of opportunities for economic benefit of the 
classes structured under a new social order. It is uncertain in what new ways the habilito system 
will develop in the future. Nevertheless, it is evident that the current productive structure and the 
economic possibilities for its users would be very different if the Brazil nut production chain 




A salient characteristic of the end of the 20th century and of the present is the important 
advances achieved in the spheres of human rights, justice and social equity. The notable 
adherence of many countries to treaties and international agreements relative to these topics 
worldwide suggest that slavery, servitude and debt-peonage, as the most typical expressions of 
the feudal domination of the post-colonial period do not take place in this new age. Nevertheless, 
there exist multiple circumstances that yet allow the emergence of variants of this type of social 
relations, through which social exploitation with an economic purpose continue. In most cases 
the above mentioned variations are simply the result of choices made based on opportunity costs 
linked to social needs, labor and productive requirements. This is especially the case in 
developing countries with important structural productive and financial deficiencies, and even 
more so in remote regions where a weak presence of the state allows for little compliance of 
labor standards or similar regulations. 
 
The debt-peonage modality can be considered as an extraordinary phenomenon worldwide, due 
to the exceptional characteristics that its process of evolution adopted in a short period of time. 
In northern Bolivia, some transcendental aspects that influenced this evolution were the 
normative changes linked to the civil condition and readdressing of land property rights and 
access to natural resources in favour of rural populations. The processes unleashed by these 
changes concerned the former patron relations and they motivated the emergency of more 
equitable commercial links, easier access to work capital and the specialization of every social 
sector within the most important production chain of the region. The mechanism adapted in 
tandem with shifts to relative social tolerance among actors linked to the resources of interest, 
but in a new context of proprietary rights. This fact suggests the prevalence of an economic 
rationality between actors valuing the benefit of decentralizing the production chain on the basis 
of its respective costs of production.  
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Figure 2. Variation in revenue from Brazil nut 
sales related to community access.  

















Economic and productive differences between people depending and not-depending on the 
habilito. Statistical test results (p-values) are based on two-sample t-tests.  









of B with 
respect to A 
p 
Total revenue from Brazil nut 
sales (Bs.) 
4020 6510 38 <0.001 
Number of harvested Brazil 
nut boxes per  family 
70 123 43 <0.001 
Price received per Brazil nut 
box, 2008 (Bs.) 
57.4 52.3 -9 
 
<0.01 
Effective days of Brazil nut 
harvesting, 2008 
29 38 23 <0.001 
Agricultural crops, 2008 – 
2009 (has) 
2.07 1.62 21 <0.001 
Rice bought, 2008 (arroba)* 8.2 12 31 <0.05 
Food used for animals 
(arroba) 
47 20 57 <0.05 
Number of pigs per family 1.63 0.71 56 <0.05 
Benefits from timber sales 
from forest management 
plans (Percentage of familiar 
total income) 
14.7 19.0  n.s 










 Table 2: Classification of interviewees based on their capacity to collect Brazil nuts 
Type of Brazil nut 
producer 





Source: Based on Zenteno (2012) 
